The Dayton Peace Accords represent the resolution of the bloodiest conflict in Europe after World War II. An agreement reached under mediation and pressure from the international public in which US diplomacy undoubtedly played a major role. According to some analysts, Dayton is a triumph of US diplomacy and foreign policy. This feat averted a further humanitarian disaster and ended the three-and-a-half-year war. While for some, it is a delayed reaction of the Clinton administration and lack of a clear strategy and leadership of US diplomacy to prevent the long-standing war and the war crimes that took place in Bosnia.
Regardless of the opposing views, it is more than clear that negotiations in Dayton were conducted under the auspices of US diplomacy led by mediator Richard Holbrooke. With decisive action from the international community led by US diplomacy and the so-called Contact Group, the ground for peace talks in Dayton was prepared.
The leaders of the warring sides represented the three sides. Bosniaks were represented by President Alija Izetbegovic, Croat President Franjo Tudjman, and Serbs President Slobodan Milosevic. The US military base in Dayton Ohio was selected for the venue. An ideal place for Holbrooke who wanted full control of the press and no leaking of information to the domestic media because it would compromise the process.
American Ambassador to Serbia Rudolf Perrin said for Holbrooke that he had an independent style and did not provide all the information claiming “the more you give a report, the more Washington interferes with the precession”. For Holbrooke, it was more than clear that it was necessary to simplify the negotiations having less unnecessary information with different interpretations that would hinder the agreement.
Simplifying the Dayton Negotiations
He started a process of simplification of the parties that participated in the process because with a higher number of parties; it is more difficult to reach an agreement. The mechanism used by Holbrooke was by forming and maximizing the chances of good coalitions to simplify the structure of parties in the negotiations.
The first step was to unite the west wing under the direct leadership of the United States, which had previously initiated the negotiations as Contact Group. It did so with the support of NATO and a joint position headed by the United States. He further exploited and nurtured the fragile coalition between Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Croatia as a common position for balance against the Serbian positions. Lastly, he used Milosevic’s bad positions to persuade him to use his influence on the Bosnian Serbs and speak on their behalf and to unite them as a negotiating party.
Holbrooke watched a key figure in Milosevic for the success of the negotiations because he considered that Karadzic and Mladic had dented their position for negotiations with war crimes, so Milosevic was vital for any success in Dayton.
To simplify the process, a strategy for negotiation of units has been used to deal with different topics. Thus, six separate working groups (units) were set up, starting with the most manageable problems to catch momentum.
The biggest challenge for Balkan leaders was the working group on territorial division and the future entity map. Even the smallest differences were resolved with aerial recording, from which the delegations were astounded by the technology. It was clear that the film was shot for possible NATO bombardment and Holbrook wanted to remind Milosevic about the outcome of the failure. For the most challenging point for Brcko, an agreement was reached to be removed from the territorial map and resolved by arbitration.
Ripening negotiations is all about timing
One of the essential features of a negotiator is the importance of an opportunist chance to influence the process (ripening negotiations), a quality that Holbrooke possessed. He decided to postpone the combat on the ground for later feeling that the side of the Serbs was not sufficiently jeopardized before the negotiations, and at the end of the talks decided to include President Clinton at the right moment. The president was involved when Holbrook had a problem with Croatian President Tudjman, where he had to give up 75% of the country to reach the previous agreement on the territory 51-49%.
US diplomacy efforts have been successful for reaching a compromise for the three sides only because the alternative put on the table was far from what they wanted and did not appeal to anyone in favour. Simply the three parties under the pressure of Holbrooke and US diplomacy realized that they had reached their “mutual hurting stalemate”.
The full text of this article was first written in 2016 in Academic Essay: “Dayton Peace Accords and American Diplomacy”, University “St. Cyril and Methodius”, Law School Iustinianus Primus- Skopje.
