Conflicts in Georgia began with the disintegration of the USSR. After 2008, Russia recognized the regions and clearly announced the new geopolitical reality and without the active involvement of the EU and security guarantees the region is in a state of deadlock.
Conflicts in Georgia began similarly as the other frozen conflicts in the region with the disintegration of the USSR. In the process of USSR de-federalization, the only legitimate heirs with a right to secession and formation of states were the “republics of the Union”.
Thus, in 1991, Georgia gained independence with secession, while, according to the old Soviet system, Abkhazia as an autonomous republic, and South Ossetia as an autonomous region remained within the borders of Georgia.
The desire of the two regions for greater autonomy and the fear of subordination from the Georgian authorities fueled nationalist sentiment. Additionally, at the height of its won independence and their desire for full territorial integrity, there was an influx of nationalist rhetoric by Georgia which completed with the motives of the separatist regions created a convenient ground for the start of the conflicts.
The history of South Ossetia frozen conflict
The tensions in South Ossetia started in 1989 with the demand to change their status from an autonomous region to an autonomous republic, which was rejected by Georgia. Tensions rose in the next year when S. Ossetia declares sovereignty on September 20, 1990, and boycotts the parliamentary elections in Georgia. Then on December 11, the Georgian parliament passed a law abolishing the autonomous status of S. Ossetia.
With these developments, the road towards the conflict opened, and on May 4, 1991, S. Ossetia declares separation from Georgia and unification with North Ossetia, which belongs in the borders of Russia. The conflict in S. Ossetia began soon whose side with the help of Russian military forces and volunteers, managed to establish control, and the next year on June 24, a ceasefire agreement was reached that did not solve the problem of S. Ossetia’s status.
A “Joint Control Commission” with a 2 + 2 format composed of Georgia, N. Ossetia, S. Ossetia, and Russia together with a peacekeeping mission consisting of Georgian, Russian and Ossetian troops. On November 6, the OSCE set up its mission to monitor the peacekeeping mission in S. Ossetia where relations have been characterized with sporadic violence.
But in general, there was a frozen situation until the proposal of Saakashvili peace treaty in the Council of Europe, which was rejected by S. Ossetia, which on September 12, 2016, conducted a new referendum on independence which is not recognized by the international community.
The history of Abkhazia frozen conflict
On the other hand, the source for the conflict in Abkhazia was not the political status but rather the fear of subordination of the Abkhazian nation. According to them, the long-term policies of political discrimination and colonization by the Georgian authorities are the main reasons for the conflict.
Demographic spillover and the increase in the Georgian population in Abkhazia from the last century is the initial fear of demographic takeover. The formal greater representation in local authorities did not erase the fear of extinction in the Abkhazian population. In contrast, in the Georgian population, it was a source of revolt because of Abkhazia’s excessive rights in local authorities that did not correspond with the demographic balance.
These two irreconcilable sources of conflict came to light at the time of the definitive breakdown of communism, where ethnic and national identities are again accentuated.
Thus, on August 14, 1992, Georgian paramilitary troops entered Abkhazia under the justification that the need to secure the railway lines from the deposed president Gamsakhurdia military troops, but they occupied the entire region and enter the capital of Sukhumi.
Apparently, the outcome from the situation in Abkhazia was clear, taking into consideration the Georgian military forces and the fact of the huge difference in the population. Still, with the support of volunteers from the North Caucasus and Russian military assistance, the Abkhaz side turned the situation in their favor completely.
After several unsuccessful ceasefires and mediation by Russia and the inability of Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze to provide assistance from the international community, Georgian forces are completely thrown out of the region in the autumn of 1993.
A quick ceasefire was reached where Russian troops would monitor a CIS operation in the region. Overseen by UN mediation, the conflict resolution process was initiated.
It is clear that stalling goes in favor of frozen conflicts, where attitudes and positions become more rigid, so in 1999 Abkhazia declared independence that was not recognized by Georgia and the international community. It also seems that Abkhazia has since been unwilling to negotiate political status in the Georgian state.
A further obstacle, in addition to the political status of Abkhazia, is the status of refugees and displaced persons. For Abkhazia, this is of essential importance that the refugees do not return to their homes. Because in such scenario the ethnic-demographic balance will be on the side of the Georgians, which “makes every decision of the political status pointless” for the Abkhaz population.
Thus, there is a status quo where Abkhazia cannot enter active negotiating status for a federal solution because it will have to solve the refugee problem. Also, the Georgian side is limited by having to deliver the agreement for the return of the displaced persons.
The misinterpretation of Georgia’s support
The balance of Russian influence in the region following Saakashvili’s pro-Western government since 2003 was seen through eventual NATO membership. The fostered support of possible membership from the West pushed the country in a completely wrong direction and extorted an entirely predictable strong response from Russia.
Soon began a strong political, economic and military support for Abkhazia and pressure on Georgia. On April 3, 2008, at the Bucharest Summit, due to the influence of European countries, the membership of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO has been postponed. The seriousness and the strategic mistake of the West for the possibility of membership is the last drop for Russia that reacts precisely as realism foresees.
The brief conflict begins on August 7, 2008, following the unrealistic and mistaken calculation of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili sending Georgian troops to the capital of South Ossetia. Soon after the Russian-Georgian conflict starts and shortly after April 12 with the help of French President Sarkozy a ceasefire is achieved.
The consequences for Georgia are enormous, and the possibilities for any further resolution of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have become minimal with the recognition of their independence by Russia. The assessment was wrong that NATO and the West were ready to respond and support Georgia with all the arsenals of hard power.
Furthermore, the Russian response can be explained with offensive realism as an effort to ensure its neighborhood. Additionally, it can be explained by defensive realism to safeguard the security and survival from NATO, which is a threat to their national interests.
Georgia turns its attention towards the EU
Following this clear message, Georgia decides to turn its attention to enhanced relations with the EU, whose support and eventual entry sees as the only opportunity for preserving the territorial integrity and resolving its frozen conflicts.
The EU reacted with diplomatic reinforcement by establishing the position of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia. Furthermore, the EU has established a civilian monitoring mission (EUMM) for patrolling administrative lines with separatist regions, but their access to separatist territories is not allowed.
After the war in 2008, the EU gets a place in the negotiating format in the so-called “Geneva talks” together with the UN, OSCE, Russia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Georgia. The official EU strategy after 2008 is “non-recognition and engagement” with the regions.
The EU is committed to the full preservation of territorial integrity and non-recognition of the separatist regions, and the primary strategy for reaching a solution is for Georgia to make progress and become an attractive partner for the separatists.
That is, through the strategy of the EU’s example of soft power, Georgia also to become attractive for the separatists bringing the parties to the negotiating table. Further, through de-isolation and engagement with the separatist regions, to achieve a transformation of the conflict and increase trust between the two sides.
Is there possible solution for the frozen conflicts in Georgia after 2008
After 2008, as we have said, Russia recognizes the regions. Clearly, it announces the new geopolitical reality whereby the basic guides of realism, it secures its neighborhood where it sees attempts from the West to expand its influence.
Since then, the regions have become increasingly cemented in the orbit of Russian influence through increased economic aid, the issuance of Russian passports, the recognition of independence and the security guarantees that makes them available.
Russia can use its entire arsenal of hard power, enjoying the advantage as the only force in the region that owns and is willing to use military capabilities and geopolitically dominate the region.
From all of this, it is clear that any solution to these frozen conflicts cannot bypass Russia as the main actor in the region. Already in 2014, Russia and Abkhazia signed a new bilateral agreement on “Alliance and Strategic Partnership”, which is facing severe condemnation from Brussels and indicates that Russia’s further course will undoubtedly continue in the same direction.
So far, Georgia cannot expect active involvement of the EU and security guarantees. Additionally, the lack of a prospect for Georgia’s EU membership seriously undermines the reform process, and its goal is to become an attractive country for the separatist regions.
From this, we can conclude that the EU role in resolving conflicts in Georgia is reduced to technical assistance and constant public diplomacy in favor of territorial integrity, but without a vision and proactive participation in the search for peace solution.
The full text of this article was first written in 2017 in Master Thesis: “The role of the EU in resolving frozen conflicts in the “Eastern Partnership” through the prism of realism”, University “St. Cyril and Methodius”, Law School Iustinianus Primus- Skopje
